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1Abstract
Aristotle begins his famous discussion of time in Book Δ of The Physics by asking
whether time belongs to “the things that exist.” In this paper I argue that Aristotle’s
apparently ambiguous answer to this question holds one of the keys to clarifying
contemporary philosophy of time. First, I argue that the metaphysical and meta-
philosophical presuppositions underlying most philosophy of time are deeply flawed.
Second, that Aristotle provides us with a much more plausible alternative set of
presuppositions about the nature of time. The Aristotelian conception of time as part of
the subject matter of physics or “the philosophy of nature” is particularly illuminating.
Finally, I examine several issues about the nature and reality of time often raised in the
context of contemporary physics and show how the Aristotelian perspective can resolve
those puzzles.
Aristotle begins his famous discussion of time in Book Δ of The Physics by asking
whether time belongs to “the things that exist”(τα οντα).1 He concludes that it does not
or does so only in a tenuous or obscure fashion. Oddly enough, he follows this with an
extensive discussion of what time is. If time does not exist, then how can it be anything?
The answer to this conundrum is that Aristotle is an anti-Platonist but not an anti-realist
about time. More generally we should understand that time exists as a mode of those
things, for Aristotle substances, which exist in a fuller sense. This Aristotelian way of
thinking about time has vital importance for a philosophy of time mired in Platonistic and
metaphysical ways of addressing the problem of time. Even as the debates in the
philosophy of time have moved away from an obsession with “the big kill” metaphysical
argument, philosophers have continued to accept a meta-philosophical position that
classifies the problem of time as a problem in metaphysics.2 In this paper, I argue that the
general acceptance of this meta-philosophical position is the fundamental mistake
bedeviling contemporary philosophy of time.
2 By assimilating the problem of time to metaphysics, one commits to a particular
conception of the kind of thing that time could be. Specifically, one commits to a
conception of the reality of time such that in order to be real, time must be, in some
sense, metaphysically necessary. However, I find this formulation of the problem of time
as a fundamental problem in metaphysics deeply obscure. It seems clear to me that being
in time is a particular way in which more metaphysically fundamental elements of the
world exist. I suggest that we return to the beginning and ask, or re-ask, the most
fundamental question of all: “What does it mean to say that time is ideal (real)?”
In the next section, I examine three typical modern arguments against the reality of
time, McTaggart’s paradox, Kurt Gödel’s argument from general relativity, and an
argument against presentism in the style of Craig Callender and Yuri Balashov.3 I find it
difficult to make out the force of these arguments. That is, I find myself thinking in each
case, “OK, that works, but so what?” All of these arguments take as their supposed
conclusion that time is in some sense “ideal” or “unreal.” In what sense? Here we return
to our core question. I will argue that in each of these cases, we will discover that the
answer to this question embedded in each of these arguments is profoundly implausible.
My point here is not that these arguments do not prove what they set out to prove in the
sense that they are invalid, but that what they do prove does not tell us anything very
interesting about time. This is because modern philosophy of time is fundamentally
mistaken about the very nature of the phenomenon it investigates and thus applies to it
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classical terms, belong to metaphysics, but to physics or the philosophy of nature.4
The alternative to such a Platonic understanding of time can be found in Aristotle’s
Physics. When Aristotle claims that time does not belong to “those things that exist,” he
is clearly not opting for the Eleatic alternative position, which claims that temporal
awareness is fundamentally deceptive about the nature of the cosmos. This, at least,
should be perfectly clear from Aristotle’s refutation of Zeno at Physics VI. Rather he is
staking out a middle ground, as he so often does. In section three, I offer an interpretation
of Physics Δ:10-14, influenced by that of Julia Annas, that articulates the senses in which
time is and is not real according to Aristotle.5 In the final section, I argue that these basic
criteria remain appropriate even though our basic physics is so different from Arisotle.
Moreover, according to these criteria time is real even though it is perfectly possible that
our universe could have been atemporal.
§2 Time and Metaphysical Necessity
It is reasonably clear what it means to say that David Hume or Immanuel Kant believed
that time was ideal. Hume explained time as a structure of relations among various Ideas;
Kant as a part of the fundamental structure of human consciousness imposed on our
representation of the world. There are certainly difficulties regarding the precise
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and Transcendental Idealists, on the one hand, and metaphysical realists about time on
the other are reasonably clear. However, in modern philosophy of time the parallel
distinction is rather more obscure. What is being denied when defenders of a block
universe claim that time is an illusion? What is the force of the “unreality of time”  or the
“ideality of time” ?
Apparently, it must mean something along the following lines–that we represent the
world as having certain temporal structure that it does not have. Consider McTaggart
first. His argument seems to be the following:
M1: To represent something as being in time is to represent
it as having, sequentially, the various monadic tense
properties.
M2: Those monadic tense properties are mutually
contradictory.
MC: Therefore, nothing can have those properties.
There are many issues related to McTaggart’s paradox, most of which have been well-
rehearsed in the literature.6 Here I raise one I am not familiar with: what advantage could
possibly make M1 even a plausible candidate for the nature of time? Consider just one of
the truly odd consequences of M1. If, as McTaggart seems to accept, the particular tense
property possessed by a temporal element, instance or event, is correlated with its
distance from the present and if time is at least dense, then any such element has an
infinite number of different properties over every finite temporal segment. Consider a
time one week ago. Over the next five minutes, over the next 1 second, it will possess an
infinite number of such monadic tense properties; and a different infinity of them over the
next second. Whether or not this system of tense properties is logically coherent, it is
bizarre in exactly the way that gives metaphysics a bad name. Yet, in addition to being
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different form by Quentin Smith. The question we need to ask is: why?
Before answering this question, it will be worth examining two more examples.
Consider Gödel’s argument mentioned above. Once again reducing it to skeletal form, we
have:
G1: Time is real if and only if the past-future evolution is
defined along a space-like foliation of the space-time.
G2: Time is real if and only if it can be defined in all
physically possible space-times.
G3: There are solutions to the Einstein Field
Equations(EFE) that have no space-like foliations.
GC: Therefore, time is not real.
Again, this argument has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature.7
Here, however, the focus will be on G2. Again, the fundamental question has to be: what
reasons could one have for believing this? Consider. General relativity tells us that the
structure of space-time is massively contingent. Gödel space-time is far from the most
bizarre solution to the EFE. Among them, for example, are space-times with closed null
geodesics in which you would see your own back.8 If space-time is contingent, why
should time not be? Why should there not simply be some space-times in which there is
time, and some in which there is not? Given general relativity, this principle seems at
least as plausible as G2.
Consider one more example. I will associate this argument with Craig Callender, but he
is certainly not the only philosopher to endorse it.
C1: Time is real if and only if presentism is true.
C2: Presentism is the doctrine that only what exists now
exists at all.
6C3: Modern physics makes it unlikely, at best, that
presentism is true.
CC: Time is probably not real.
C3 is almost certainly true and thus presentism is almost certainly false. So, what?
Presentism is a philosophical theory about time, not a background assumption that
theories of time have to satisfy. Any adequate theory must be able to make sense of the
difference between past, present and future things, and any theory that claims that there is
no difference between them would be a theory that makes an important part of
temporality ideal. However, C2 is a stronger claim than this; it is the claim that the past-
future distinction only counts as a real distinction if made in terms of a metaphysically
thick conception of tensed or momentary existence. And, this puts the cart before the
horse.
All three of these arguments have been largely beaten to death in the literature.
However, they have two quite significant shared features; features which have together
served to distort debate in analytic philosophy of time in a significant way. First, all three
arguments depend on substantive metaphysical premises. While M1, G2 and C1 might be
true, they clearly outrun anything given directly by the phenomenology of temporal
experience. Consider G2 for example. In what way could my experience of temporal flow
and becoming be the experience of all possible models of the Einstein Field Equations? It
may be the case that my experience does represent phenomena common to all such
models, but my experience is of this world, not of bizarre and modally distant worlds. By
failing to distinguish the contents of temporal experience from the metaphysical
implications of that experience, the evidentiary and argumentative structure of
philosophy of time becomes deeply muddled.
7The second shared feature of these metaphysical premises is related to the first, but is,
if anything, more pernicious. The fundamental consequence of these characterizations of
time is to separate the reality of time from any particular concrete contents of the
universe. Thus, pure determinations of tense which are a fundamental determination of
material beings; a feature of space-time which must be independent of the actual
distribution of matter and energy in space-time; a definition of existence that serves as a
fundamental constraint on the nature of material existence, or even existence generally.
What they have in common is that they all insist that time can be real only if it belongs to
the τα οντα, to the fundamental ontological structure of the cosmos. What all of these
have in common is that they commit us to a Platonist conception of time; a conception of
time as an ontologically independent component of the universe. However, as Aristotle
pointed out a very long time ago, time simply does not exist in this way.
§3 Aristotle’s Anti-Platonist Definition of Time
In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that there is a non-idealist alternative to the
Platonist conception of time. On this conception of time, our phenomenology of time
represents actual facts about the contents of the world and thus allows us to claim that the
world is temporal even though there are both physically and metaphysically possible
worlds that are not temporal and in which any temporal elements of experience could
properly be described as illusory.
As Julia Annas has argued, such a position is at least implicit in Aristotle’s treatment of
time as the measure or number of change (or motion) in Book Δ of the physics. While
this discussion is notoriously obscure, Annas effectively argues that the most coherent
interpretation flows from the realization that Aristotle intends his argument to rely on and
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Roughly, Annas claims that just as Aristotle claims to be able to explain the use of
numbers via an appeal to acts of counting, thus avoiding appeal to abstract Platonic
numbers, he can explain our experience of time via our acts of measuring or counting the
amount of change undergone by certain processes as compared to other processes.
However, Aristotle is neither a radical nominalist about numbers nor an idealist about
time. Consider a field containing five cows. On the Platonic account of number the fact
that there are 5 cows in the field involves more objects than the cows. Generally we
would say that it involves the cows, the set or collection of cows and the abstract object,
FIVE, with which either the cows or the set of cows stand in some relation. At
Metaphysics Ι Aristotle argues that we can make perfectly adequate sense of the fact that
there are 5 cows in the field using only 5 cows and the fact that we can count9. There are
five cows in the field because when we count the cows in the field we get to five and then
run out of cows. In one sense, it seems clearly correct to say about numbers, as Aristotle
says about time, that without anyone to count or to measure numbers do not exist.
It might therefore be tempting to think that Aristotle advocates a subjectivist or idealist
account of mathematics. That seems inadequate, however, because Aristotle seems
committed to the belief that counting does discover objective facts about the world.
Whether or not anyone counts the cows, anyone who chooses to count cows will discover
that there are five of them. The objectivity of counting depends at least as much on the
“cooperation” of the world as it does on the existence of people to count. If the world did
not contain any individual substances, the act of counting would not tell us anything true
9about the world no matter how much we divided the world up into countable units.
Consider, for example, “That which is other in species is other than something in
something, and this must belong to both; e.g. if it is an animal other in species, both are
animals.”10 I take it that at least part of the point of these and related passages is to
establish that unities and contrarieties on which counting depends are, in fact, to be found
in the things counted.
Now consider time as the number of change. The parallel Platonist, although probably
not Platonic, picture of time depends on the idea that the objectivity of our use of, for
example, clocks to measure the rate of change of various other processes depends on the
movement or flow of some “abstract entity” TIME, which contains all of these processes
and which we approximate by various processes that bear particular relationships to that
entity. As with numbers, Aristotle intends to explain the objectivity of temporal
measurement without recourse to spooky platonic entities. He begins with the basic idea
that we are aware of a wide variety of processes including our internal psychological
processes and various external processes of alteration, locomotion, generation and
corruption(218b20ff.). Consider a single process of locomotion, ball moving from point
A to point B. To measure the change in the location of the ball, we must be able to
identify the ball throughout the process of change and “mark” the ball at point A as a
beginning and the ball at point B as the end(219a11ff., 219b24). This provides the
concepts of before and after; the idea of changing from a beginning state to an ending
state. However, not quite the full account of time because the single process does not
provide any idea of the rate of change from A to B. That arises from comparing distinct
processes(220a1ff.). For simplicity consider two balls collocated at A. The first ball again
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moves from A to B, while the second ball moves from A to C, further from A than B is.
Thus, we say that the second ball moves faster; its location changes more during the
movement of the first ball. We live in a world in which self-identical beings changing
their states and doing so in ways that allow comparisons between them are simply
ubiquitous. We also discover that certain processes, for example cyclical astronomical
processes, are particularly useful as a stable backdrop against which to judge the rates of
other processes(220b15ff).11
As with numbers Aristotle seems correctly to say that without someone to do the
measuring and the comparisons of various processes, those comparisons do not really
make sense. Once again, however, we should not allow this to mislead us into associating
Aristotle with the Eleatics. When Aristotle claims that time depends on temporal
awareness, he is not claiming that time is constituted only by temporal awareness, and
that our objective description of the world can dispense with it as a pure product of
human subjectivity. It is just as true that Ball 1 moves faster than Ball 2, whether or not it
is observed, as that there are five cows, and not six, in the field.
To recap, Aristotle’s definition of time as the number of change allows him resist
Platonism about time; he need not admit time to the ranks of “those things which exist,”
while also managing to avoid full-fledged Eleatic denial of the objectivity of temporality.
He is able to do this because he recognizes that temporal awareness is merely the
awareness of certain characteristics of the processes that constitute the cosmos.
§4 A neo-Aristotelian Alternative
What characteristics of those processes does temporal awareness report? What is the
“factual” content of temporal awareness? Alternatively, what does our temporal
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awareness represent the world as being? Only once we can answer this question can we
determine whether the world actually is the way that temporal awareness represents it.
From Aristotle’s discussion, we can extract the following: our temporal awareness
represents the world as (i) containing coherent processes (ii) that evolve in single
direction from “earlier” states to “later” states and (iii) such that the states of parts of
those processes earlier than us at any time are determinate and later ones are not. I will
discuss each of these conditions in order. The first is fundamental to temporal awareness
because only this allows us to make sense of a connected ordering of states into earlier
and later. That is a “coherent” process is one that we can identify across a variety of
changes, such that the idea of evolution from one state to another makes sense. In
Aristotle, the paradigm case of such a process is that of a single substance undergoing a
process of generation or corruption, of natural change. Even if we do not want to commit
ourselves to a substance-based ontology, time does represent the world as a collection
substances undergoing processes of alteration. Of course, the most fundamental such
process to our own awareness, the immediate home of temporal awareness, is our
awareness of ourselves as a self-identical person undergoing psychological alterations.
The second condition is the requirement that it be possible to order the processes in the
universe in terms of before and after. The fundamental constraint here is the existence of
a “markable” distinction between some states that precede other states. Some classes of
processes must occur in only one direction, for example, life, or in Aristotle’s terms
generation and corruption. If everything in the universe resets itself, our temporal
awareness is illusory. Finally, if there is no coherent distinction between past and future
events, we could certainly claim that our temporal awareness is illusory.
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Moreover, this is just the way that our universe is. Our universe does contain many
things with “long, skinny world-lines” including us. Many of those things undergo
sequences of irreversible changes. Moreover, there is a distinction between our past, in
this case our past light-cone, which is determinate, and the indeterminate rest of the
universe.12 But, note that nothing about the fundamental nature of being means that our
universe must be this way. Our universe is temporal, but that fact is neither a
metaphysical nor a physical necessity.
There are of course differences between the Aristotelian conception of time and any
neo-Aristotelian account compatible with contemporary physics. The most important
such difference arises from relativity theory. Reduced to its essentials, the Aristotelian
definition treats that mode of material beings as participants in natural processes such that
the various rates of those processes are measurable. However, in the special and general
theories of relativity the rates of processes are determined by the proper time along their
world lines. Here we come to the first fundamental difference between the Aristotelian
and neo-Aristotelian pictures. Aristotle clearly believes that the local time generated by
particular processes can be extended univocally to provide a global measure of time
allowing straightforward comparisons of all processes (219b10). I have argued elsewhere
that we have good reasons to accept that proper time is all that we have, in some sense,
really been experiencing and that the conception of global time is inferred from that
experience.
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Perhaps, the simplest way to grasp the force of these criteria is the consider some
possible universes where time might appear to be real without being real. Consider three
physically possible models of the universe such that we would say that a being with
temporal awareness much like ours was deceived about the nature of their universe. First,
consider Gödel-type space-times or others with significant acausal structures, closed or
almost closed time-like curves. There are some well-behaved world-lines in some such
universes. There might be regions of such a space-time where a sentient being with
something like our temporal awareness could evolve. Such a being might represent their
small well-behaved piece of the universe as temporal, and believe that this true of the
universe as a whole, only to later discover their mistake. Especially as we move away
modally to space-times where e.g. all of almost of the null geodesics are closed. In such a
universe it is perfectly possible that the limit of our vision is our own back. However, we
have no evidence that our universe is one of the possible universes containing significant
acausal structure.14
Second, consider the dust models of general relativistic cosmology. The stress-energy
tensor of these models, which encodes the space-time distribution of matter and energy,
is a scalar function.  This models a space-time filled with a smooth distribution of non-
interacting dust of varying density. The simplest such models have not merely scalar but
constant stress-energy tensors. Such a universe does not contain “coherent processes
undergoing evolution” in any meaningful sense. In such a universe, a sentient being
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might develop a time sense based on the apparent stability of their local environment.
However, this would be a purely parochial way of relating to what is in reality simply a
smooth homogeneous mass.15
It was once thought quite likely that our universe was one of these universes with a
fundamentally homogeneous distribution of matter throughout space and time.
Astronomers once thought that stars were roughly evenly distributed until the discovery
of galaxies. Then that galaxies must be, until the discovery of clusters and super clusters.
Now, it appears that structure appears everywhere we look and every scale. The
discovery by COBE of variations in the microwave background radiation of the universe
indicates that The Big Bang itself must have possessed internal structure.[ref]
Finally, consider a classical model–the simple solar system models of classical celestial
mechanics. In such a universe there may seem to be but are not really any irreversible
processes, in fact by the classical recurrence theorem the entire universe resets itself on
quite accessible timescales. Again, this too is a universe in which time might seem to be
real, because of the parochial perspective of particular sentients, but which it would be
perfectly reasonable to say is in fact atemporal.
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However, once again, our universe is not one of those universes. Our universe contains
a predominance of spatio-temporally localized processes, many of them undergoing
massively complicated, apparently irreversible chemical and thermodynamic processes.
We have no grounds for even suspecting the existence of significant violations of
causality. It seems obvious that our temporal awareness represents our world to us the
way that it actually is, and that therefore, in the only way that makes sense, time is real.
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